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The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) intends to enhance EU member states’ performance 
with regard to social inclusion.  In this context a set of commonly agreed performance indicators 
plays an important role.  While the communicative power of a synthetic indicator has been 
recognised, several objections have been raised against such a construction. In this paper, we argue 
that a set of separate indicators can in principle be combined into one synthetic performance index 
without giving up on the notion of subsidiarity, and without fundamentally impairing the peer 
pressure incentives that constitute an important rationale for OMC. We complement the 
presentation of the conceptual framework with a number of empirical applications, thereby 
indicating how the basic method may be instrumental for policy benchmarking practice.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
There is a broad consensus throughout Europe that, even within an EMU, each nation 
represents a welfare state sui generis.  It explains why member states are willing to remain 
responsible for their social policy, even if they explicitly acknowledge that they share many 
core social policy objectives. As phrased by Scharpf (2002a,b), institutional differences, 
distinct policy legacies and normative orientations imply that ‘Europe’ must preserve its own 
democratic legitimacy by explicitly taking the legitimate diversity of member states into 
account. These convictions motivate the EU’s current key operational tool for enhancing 
member states’ performance with regard to social inclusion: a modus operandi known as the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This method was established and conceptually refined 
in 2000 at the Lisbon, Feira, and Nice European Councils.
1 Essentially, OMC is a procedure 
in which member states (biennially) provide National Action Plans on Social Inclusion 
(NAPincls). These link EU-wide objectives to the domestic situation and to (sub)national 
policy measures. Next, the NAPincls go through a process of peer reviewed monitoring, 
comparison and evaluation. The NAPincls also underlie the ‘Joint Report on Social Inclusion’ 
delivered by the Commission.  
 
The wording National Action Plans is crucial, since it underscores that the effective choice of 
welfare policy measures is still the prerogative of national welfare states.  The peer review of 
the NAPincls is expected to provide the impetus for national governments to improve upon 
the outcomes of their welfare policies.  OMC has been categorized as a ‘soft law’ approach. 
This notion simultaneously conveys (i) the limited desirability and ability of direct EU 
steering of national policy making in the field of social policy and (ii) the idea that nation 
states may adapt their policies even in the absence of legally binding supranational steering 
instruments.  
 
Given its recent inception, we do not know yet whether and how nation states may adapt their 
own welfare policies in the light of OMC.  Observers have discerned at least three interrelated 
ways for OMC to effectively foster social inclusion and the combat against poverty.  First, 
OMC is considered an intelligent, context-sensitive ‘learning-by-monitoring’-procedure.  That 
is, member states may learn from identified best practices in other countries and apply these, 
                                                 
1 In fact, the generic notion OMC is nowadays applied in different policy areas. ‘The’ OMC we discuss in the 
paper, i.e. OMC as applied to social inclusion, is for example pre-dated by a somewhat dissimilar (and 
‘stronger’; see below) OMC for national employment policies.  Its use (in stronger or weaker forms) will also be 
extended to other areas, such as e.g. pension policies.       2 
mutatis mutandis, at home (see e.g. Hemerijck, 2002).  For some sceptics, this begs the thorny 
question whether any member state has an incentive to adapt its own ‘distinct’ policy. The 
answer is related to a second alleged advantage: since OMC builds on the recognition of core 
social values via commonly agreed objectives, it should enable a more precise substantial 
definition of the somewhat fuzzy ‘European Social Model’. And this can in turn be “a 
powerful driver to improve the quality of social protection in Europe” (Vandenbroucke, 
2002).   One may wonder at this point how ‘the substance’ can in practice become ‘a powerful 
driver’. It seems that one needs the third avenue, as explicitly discussed by some authors, to 
answer the previous questions.  Publicly scrutinized comparative benchmarking may 
eventually entail political pressure on national states. A ‘virtuous competition’ (Giammusso 
and Tangorra, 2002) could emerge with regard to social inclusion, as each member state is 
compared with others on account of the commonly defined objectives.  
 
Using the conditional in many of the previous sentences is warranted. As the OMC is 
currently conceived, there remains a clear danger that this soft law tactic degenerates into 
spineless red-tapeism.  Its success primarily hinges upon “the willingness of those which de 
facto control national policies” and, absent such willingness, NAPincls “may simply reflect 
business as usual and the unfortunate liaison officers attending innumerable rounds of 
meetings in Brussels may take the blame for national policies on which they have no 
influence.” (Scharpf, 2002a, p. 33). More precisely, key decision-makers today face few 
incentives to adapt their welfare policies but those resulting from the OMC-comparative 
exercise as (and a fortiori: if) it is received domestically.
2  The last point is worth stressing in 
view of the criticisms raised by some direct stakeholders following the first actual 
implementation of the OMC on poverty and social exclusion. The European Anti-Poverty 
Network, for example, explicitly mentions that “national governments confront no penalties 
for non-compliance with their Plan”. It further commented that there was almost no public 
awareness, no media interest and even little national parliamentary awareness about the first 
NAPincls, that these first NAPincls largely seem to have been written as reports for ‘Europe’ 
rather than tools for effective policy integration tools, and that “the lack of incentives to 
participate seriously may permanently consign the NAPincl process to the margins.” (Duffy, 
2002; see also Atkinson, 2002b).   
 
From any of the above perspectives, the construction of a set of common indicators for social 
inclusion is an issue of utmost importance for the success of OMC. Its mere existence is a 
conditio sine qua non for going beyond the point of paying political lip service to the 
commitment at Lisbon of making a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social 
exclusion by 2010.  Learning from each other can barely be done if a shared assessment 
toolkit is lacking. Moreover, the set of common indicators de facto embodies the commonly 
agreed objectives (Atkinson, 2002a; Vandenbroucke, 2002). They are therefore vital –for any 
stakeholder– for benchmarking, for measuring mutual and relative progress, etc.  Notably for 
that reason, they should be considered as a key ingredient in providing the necessary domestic 
incentives for national policy makers.  
 
As an upshot of the efforts by the Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2001, an 
agreement on a first set was reached at the Laeken Summit.  It comprises 10 primary 
indicators which, together with secondary and tertiary indicators, are said to reflect the 
                                                 
2 Contrary to the original OMC, which is used for employment policy, the common objectives on social 
inclusion do currently not translate into commonly shared policy  targets, valid for each member state and 
scrutinized by the Commission.  Another important difference is the lack of explicit financial tools in the social 
inclusion case, whereas the OMC-employment is linked to the European Structural Funds.     3 
multidimensional nature of social inclusion.
3,4  It is important to note that the indicators all 
measure outputs: they are, intentionally, performance indicators.  The choice to ignore inputs 
in the benchmarking exercise is again grounded in the concern to maintain the locus of control 
for social policy at the member states’ level. The list is not definitive as other indicators will 
probably be included. Even in its current configuration one faces problems of data availability 
and comparability between member states. Also, and perhaps strangely enough, it only 
partially coincides today with the shorter list of “structural indicators for social cohesion” 
presented yearly by the Commission to allow for an objective assessment of the progress 
made towards the Lisbon Council objectives. Insofar as such sources of confusion are 
transitory, we will not address them here.   
 
Rather, we start from the earlier recognition that commonly agreed indicators on poverty and 
social inclusion may be useful for many purposes, but that these underlying rationales seem to 
require different kinds of ‘sets’ of indicators. This holds especially as regards their 
dimensionality.  On the one hand, from the pure ‘learning’-perspective, it seems that a set of 
indicators can hardly be too small: there are many (intertwined) ways in which social 
exclusion manifests itself, and probably many best practices are available. On the other hand, 
the same set can quickly be regarded as too big in view of its capacity as an effective, easy-to-
communicate means of advancing (domestic) public interest, i.e. as a leverage tool that 
implicitly aims at generating appropriate incentives for decision makers.   
 
With these considerations as a background, we outline in this paper a method for constructing 
a synthetic indicator for social inclusion performance. We present this method in the next 
section after listing the main arguments that have been raised in favour or against a synthetic 
indicator.  The central feature of the index we put forward is that, absent any consensus on 
social policy priorities, it grants each member state extensive leeway for deciding how to 
evaluate its own indicators. Importantly, when compared to the use of a set as a 
multidimensional benchmarking instrument qua incentive-generating tool, the obtained 
summary index does not lead to fundamentally different responses by member states. We 
provide an illustrative empirical application in section 3, demonstrate how to use the method 
for intertemporal analysis, and address some issues pertaining to sensitivity analysis. We also 
briefly touch upon the relationship between the synthetic (output) performance measure and 





                                                 
3 A great deal of the preparatory work to the eventual establishment of a set at Laeken was carried out by A. 
Atkinson, B. Cantillon, E. Marlier and B. Nolan.  Their carefully justified recommendations have meanwhile 
been published. The Belgian Presidency invited comments on the Atkinson et al.-report. Most of these 
comments, often related to the question whether the indicators are indeed adequate to capture social exclusion.  
These comments have been gathered in a special issue of Politica Economica (see the list of references at the 
end). 
4 Note, though, that several of the primary indicators are also reported via breakdowns by age, gender, or other 
characteristics.  It leads Atkinson (2002) to state that “…some 70 numbers are requested as primary indicators, 
whereas fewer than half of that number are requested as secondary indicators.  This is the reverse of the 
relationship we had in mind.”  Indeed, the concern for transparency provided a major justification for the 
recommendation in Atkinson et. al. (2002) that there should be a restricted number of primary indicators.     4 
2. A SYNTHETIC INDICATOR FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION 
 
2.1 Few pros and many cons? 
 
To be sure, we are well aware that today many decision makers and experts are quite 
concerned about the emergence of league tables and the ‘naming and shaming’ which these 
could entail. Even if we recognise the value of incentives, we do share some concerns with 
them. As already indicated, ‘one number’ is a far too shallow basis for learning about the 
multiple factors causing poverty and social exclusion. Also, as it stands now there are 
undeniably a number of measurement problems regarding the indicators. We take it here that 
most of such data problems are transitory. And we underline that this problem is genuine to 
the (inter-country comparison of) individual components, not to a synthetic indicator per se.   
We here therefore only will survey the most important remarks that focus on the idea of 
merging individual components in one number, and take up other data issues in sections 3 and 
4. 
 
The (few) stated pros of doing so are all related to the idea of communication, the ‘eye-
catching property’, i.e. fostering public awareness by ‘providing the big picture’ so as to avoid 
the fuzziness and possibly even the loss of credibility associated with a plethora of single 
indicators (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 2002; Hills, 2002; Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission (JRC), 2002).  We furthermore consider the remarks of Micklewright (2001) 
highly relevant: lacking a good synthetic index, there are always the dangers that (i) one 
reverts to constructing very crude country-specific indices, e.g. by averaging ranks, or by 
counting the number of national indicators below resp. above the European average; (ii) that 
none of the indicators gets sufficient attention; or even (iii) that excessive public attention is 
again focused on just one dimension, thus abolishing the original desideratum of respecting 
the multidimensional nature of social exclusion. Last but not least, it is certainly worthy to 
note that the Commission itself, within the framework of its structural indicators, is not 
unsympathetic to the idea of ‘composite indicators’. It has already developed two such indices 
to help assessing the knowledge-based economy, and is willing to extend their use to other 
areas (COM (2002) 551 Final, 16.10.2002). 
 
Yet, on balance, the idea of  a synthetic indicator for social exclusion has hitherto bumped 
into criticism.  A (too) simple big picture may send misleading messages and may invite one 
to draw simplistic policy conclusions (JRC, 2002). The multidimensionality of social 
exclusion also manifests itself in the fact that different indicators have no common 
measurement unit, which makes transformation to a common metric “a tricky operation” 
(Brandolini, 2002). In this particular respect, Atkinson et al. (2002) list several objections 
against the idea of using rank orders, both for the constituent individual indicators and for a 
synthetic indicator, inter alia because these do not convey how far away countries are from 
each other or from (external) targets. Additionally, they state, that “politically, the process 
will not encourage member states to learn from each other if attention is focused on a single 
rank order.” 
 
The main opposition is however related to the question whether and how to weigh the sub-
indicators.  Two matters of concern can be discerned.  First, on a conceptual level, if one 
agrees on a set of (leading) indicators, this in itself may be taken as evidence that one has 
selected equally imperative components of social inclusion. The very idea of mutually 
weighting them has therefore been deemed undesirable by some authors: allowing for a trade-    5 
off between different dimensions is blocked on a priori grounds.
5  Logically, such a position 
entails that countries are only demonstrably outperformed if they are weakly dominated in all 
dimensions of the indicator-set by at least one other country. Only a lexicographic ordering of 
observations is allowed. More often than not this could result in the finding that the large 
majority of countries constitute ‘their own benchmarks’ when considering the full picture: 
they can just pick, choose, and point at sub-indicators to convey the message that they are 
indeed distinct, and not weakly dominated by any other country.   Table 1 provides a simple 
hypothetical example: with just two indicators for 10 countries, there is nowhere a weak 
dominance relationship, and hence there are no overall grounds for any country to be 
considered outperformed on social inclusion if the two dimensions are judged equally 
imperative. While admittedly fictitious (some EU countries would in practice be 
outperformed by others in terms of Table 1’s dimensions), it is easy to see that in reality the 
big picture quickly risks to become totally obscure as more indicators are added. 
 
Table 1: a hypothetical example 
Country 
 
I II III IV V  VI VII VIII IX X  
























As a matter of fact, strictly adhering to the idea that all indicators are equally commanding in 
a global benchmarking exercise quite counter-intuitively implies that any country is 
effectively better off by consolidating its idiosyncracy.  This need not be bad per se.  But for 
genuine benchmarking exercises, or for virtuous competition, it clearly risks to get the above 
conception of ‘not weighting’ the indicators self-defeating. 
 
Furthermore, it is hard to deny that scarce resources de facto compel governments to make 
choices and set priorities: any policy choice has its opportunity cost. Any national government 
–at least implicitly– in many instances has to consider how to mutually trade-off various 
policy outcomes.  In fact, as regards the problem addressed in this paper, the related ideas of 
legitimate diversity and subsidiarity seem to suggest strongly that countries are even entitled 
to set different outcome priorities. 
 
It is precisely the latter point which has lead to a second type of objections against the idea of 
weighting.  These are ‘practical’, i.e. political objections. Again quoting Atkinson et al., “in 
the context of the EU, there are evident difficulties in reaching agreement on such weights, 
given that each member state has its own national specificity.” It is this objection that we put 
central in the rest of our paper.  Specifically, we take it that a good synthetic indicator for 
social inclusion should grant considerable discretion to each country when assigning its own 
policy weights, without allowing them to put all weight exclusively on one dimension.  In the 
next subsection we demonstrate how this can be achieved. 
 
 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Brandolini (2002): “ For the sake of simplicity, -but the observation carries over to more complicated 
formulations- suppose that the summary index equals the arithmetic mean of the selected indicators.  In adopting 
such an index, we are implicitly assuming that one unit more of indicator A can be substituted for one unit less 
of indicator B or vice versa.  If A is the unemployment rate and B the proportion of people failing to reach 65, 
our summary index would suggest that the valuation of the social situation is unchanged when the 
unemployment rate is reduced by 1 when the unemployment rate is reduced by 1 percentage point at the same 
time as the proportion of people dying before 65 is raised by 1 percentage point.  I do not think that this 
conclusion is acceptable, nor is it likely to gain wide acceptance.”     6 
2.2 A ‘Subsidiarity-Respecting’ Synthetic Indicator for Social Inclusion 
 
Consider the general case of m indicators of social inclusion for n countries, and let   be the 
value of indicator i in country j. We want to merge these individual indicators into a single-
valued synthetic indicator, defined as the weighted average of the original set of m single-
dimensional indicators. As we eventually want to evaluate ‘policy’ performance, the weights 
should preferably reflect policy priorities. Within that perspective, however, it is indeed 
difficult to specify a priori any generally acceptable weights to be accorded to each indicator. 




This procedure was originally proposed in the context of macroeconomic performance 
evaluation by Melyn and Moesen (1991); see also Cherchye (2001) for a methodological 
discussion. Since then, similar methods have been applied to other types of macro-level 
assessments. For example, Mahlberg and Obersteiner (2001) and Cherchye and Kuosmanen 
(2002) adopted benefit-of-the-doubt weighting for cross-country assessments of human 
development and sustainable development performance. 
 
A study that is more closely related to ours is that of Storrie and Bjurek (2000), who analyze 
the labour market performance of EU countries. Our analysis is slightly different in scope. In 
addition, and more importantly, we adopt a rather different methodological perspective. 
Specifically, while Storrie and Bjurek build their argument on characterizing the set of 
performance benchmarks (as a convex ‘efficiency frontier’ of the observed vectors), our 
procedure explicitly starts from weighting the individual social inclusion indicators (and 
selects benchmarks directly within the set of observed countries). While both approaches are 
related in a mathematical sense (cf. the duality theorem of linear programming), the (‘primal’) 






Generally, the construction of a synthetic indicator proceeds in two steps. In a first step the 
original data, i.e. the country-specific values of the sub-indicators, are normalized. We note 
here that some social inclusion indicators can be considered as ‘bads’ (i.e. higher values 
represent worse performance; e.g., long term unemployment rate) while others can be 
considered as ‘goods’ (i.e. higher values represent better performance; e.g., life expectancy). 
To render goods and bads commensurable, any normalization procedure for social inclusion 
indicators should take this distinction into account.  We denote the normalized counterpart of 
each   by  . To simplify notation, we further use   to refer to the lowest value for the i-
th indicator over all countries in the sample, and   to refer to the highest value.  The 
particular method we use in this paper takes the difference between the sub-indicator value of 
country  j  and the corresponding value of the worst-performing country, and divides this 



















y = . 
     7 















                                                
 
 
In both cases, the values of the normalized indicators vary between 0 and 1, 0 always 
corresponding to the worst (cross-section) performance in the sample and 1 corresponding to 
the best performance. And, importantly in view of the criticisms raised against mere rankings, 
the normalized figures clearly reflect the intensity of the relative performance differences.  
 
A slightly modified approach that deserves special mentioning in the present context is one 
where actual performance is evaluated with respect to an exogenously determined benchmark 
value for the sub-indicators. In the above formulas, the reference value for each indicator is 
endogenously selected as the best practice within the sample of countries, which is in line 
with the current gist of political arguments. Yet, the possibility of setting explicit targets for a 
social inclusion indicator, or of comparing with best practices in other, non-EU countries, can 
be readily incorporated in the procedure.  For example, the same normalization procedure, 





 replacing our   and  , is used for the 






Indeed, the same or highly similar normalization procedures underlie many other existing 
synthetic indicators. Still, it is worth to point out at this point that the weighting method 
discussed below is also applicable to alternative normalizations (see, e.g., JRC (2002) for a 
recent assessment of alternatives). 
 
Actually, we can expect the normalization procedure to have a rather limited impact on the 
global performance results. In particular, it can be shown that a normalization procedure only 
affects the results of our synthetic performance measure through restrictions that are 
eventually imposed on the implicitly selected policy weights, which reflect the relative 
importance of each social inclusion performance dimension (see below).
6 Stated otherwise, 
(only) if one wants to impose  such weight restrictions, then the different indicators need to be 
expressed in a comparable measurement unit. In our opinion, imposing weight restrictions 
should be possible, and the normalization procedure we accordingly presented (which allows 





After normalization, the next step typically involves aggregation, per country, of the single-
dimensional performance indices into a weighted sum. The central issue here pertains to the 
specification of the weights. Aggregation/weighting questions have been extensively studied 
in the literature on productivity indices; see, e.g., Balk (2002) for a discussion. The synthetic 
social inclusion index that we propose below is firmly rooted in that literature. 
 
 
6 Specifically, it can be shown that the performance assessment model without weight restrictions (see (2)) is a 
special version of the Charnes et al. (1978) Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model. Absent any weight 
restrictions (but non-negativity), a normalization procedure is then not even required. See, e.g., Lovell and Pastor 
(1995) for invariance properties of DEA models with respect to measurement units.     8 
Normalized indicators can in principle be aggregated in several ways. In the most simple case 
one uses predetermined weights associated with each single indicator. For example, one can 
take the average of the different single indicators, which implies equal weighting. Another 
example, which deviates only slightly from the equal weighting procedure, is the construction 
of the HDI (UNDP, 2002). However, as discussed before, we believe that the indicator 
weights should be sensitive to national policy priorities. In that respect, it seems hardly 
tenable that each country de facto assigns equal weights to the different dimensions of social 
inclusion. As noted before, the specification of a priori weights seems a very difficult task 
when differing policy priorities prevail over countries.  
 
By contrast, the procedure adopted in this paper reconstructs ‘implicit’ (or ‘shadow’) policy 
weights  from the observed performance (i.e. a posteriori). More specifically, the relative 
weight accorded to each dimension is endogenously  determined in our performance 
evaluation model, and reflects the associated relative performance of the country under 
evaluation. Stated otherwise, good relative performance in a particular dimension is seen as 
‘revealed’ evidence of setting high national policy priority to that dimension. This seems an 
attractive second best route in the absence of full information about the true policy priorities. 
 
The proposed methodology selects the most favorable weights for each country. Attractively, 
the resulting performance index hence respects the ‘legitimate diversity’-aspect of social 
inclusion policies. In particular, policy makers can hardly claim that an unfair weighting 
scheme is employed for evaluating their country as any other weight profile would only 
worsen the position vis-à-vis the other countries in the sample. The method reveals optimal 
priority orderings for each evaluated country conditional upon the observed performance in 
each dimension. 
 
Notwithstanding the constructive treatment of countries’ diversity, another appealing feature 
of the method is its flexibility: it still allows for imposing various kinds of additional weight 
restrictions. Indeed, while it is hardly conceivable that experts will ever agree on ‘point 
estimates’ for country-specific weights accorded for each policy dimension, it seems much 
more reasonable to assume that they can reach consensus on bounds to be respected by the 
relative policy weights. Such consensus positions are readily incorporated in the proposed 
weighting procedure, as we discuss further on. 
 
 
MODELING A SYNTHETIC INDEX FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION 
 
Generally, we can define a synthetic index of social inclusion in the OMC-context as the ratio 
of a country’s actual performance over its ‘benchmark performance’, where performance is 
measured as a weighted sum of the single indicator values. Benchmark performance is 
represented by the (normalized) benchmark vector   of social inclusion indicators. Using w
* y i 
( ) to represent the weight accorded to each indicator i and   
( ; ) to indicate benchmark performance in each policy dimension i, 



























.     9 
Two questions remain in making this relative performance measure operational: (1) we need 
to define benchmark performance, and (2) we need to specify the relative weights accorded to 
the different dimensions of social inclusion.  
 
The first question is easy to solve. We identify best practice from observed performance; we 
simply select the country which maximizes the overall performance value under the weights 


















 ∑ . 
 
Note that, since the weights are country-specific, nothing precludes that each country is 
compared with its proper best practice; other countries can be associated with different 
benchmark observations. 
 
Our solution to the second question has been informally introduced above: we select the 
weights that maximize the resulting performance values for the country (j) under evaluation. 
At this stage, we only impose that the weights cannot be negative, i.e. that the synthetic value 
is a non-decreasing function of the individual social inclusion indicators. This gives the 
following performance measure for each country j (where SI stands for ‘Synthetic Index’ and 
‘Social Inclusion’): 
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n ∑ m i (i ), we have 
; and higher index values can be interpreted as better overall performance. The 
generosity of the method is immediate: the weights are chosen in such a way that no other 
weight combination would yield a higher relative performance value for country j. And if   
< 1, there are other countries k ∈ {1,..,n} \ {j} in the rest of the sample that would obtain a 
higher overall index value, even when using country j’s most favorable weights.  
1,..., =
0 j SI ≤≤
j SI
 
We illustrate the approach, applying it to our earlier example, in Table 2. Now we find that 
some countries are demonstrably outperformed by others in terms of SI, even when applying 
their most favorable weights. The SI differences are not very pronounced, which reflects 
benefit-of-the-doubt weighting. Additionally, we recall that the procedure we adopted is 
sensitive to the intensity of performance differences. This feature here most notably shows up 
in country VI’s SI-value, which  is extremely close to that of country VII (cf. their underlying 
original values in Table 1).  Of course, in reality, differences could well be more pronounced 
as will be shown in our applications in section 3.  
 
To illustrate the impact of a benefit-of-the-doubt perspective, we compare the SI results with 
those of a measure obtained by a priori imposing equal weights on the two single performance     10 
dimensions; see again Table 2, where ‘EW’ stands for ‘Equal Weights’.
7 Unsurprisingly, the 
SI values are never below the EW values, thus directly demonstrating the impact of 
endogenously selecting country-specific most favorable policy weights. In some cases the 
differences are rather pronounced. Two notable examples in that respect are countries VII and 
X, which both achieve an SI value of 100%, while their EW value only amounts to about 70%. 
These two countries are heavily specialized in one particular policy dimension: they mainly 
focus their policy on either poverty abatement (country X) or unemployment abatement 
(country VII); see also the original data in Table 1. Such specialization effects show up in the 
implicit weights that underlie the computation of the respective SI values. We return to this 
specialization issue later, when we will discuss the restrictions on policy weights. 
 
Table 2: synthetic indicators for the hypothetical example 
Country 
 
I II III IV V  VI VII VIII IX X  
SI  Value  100%  93.67% 100% 95.88%  92.94%  99.65% 100% 90.96% 100%  100% 
EW  Value 100% 92.27% 97.43% 91.13% 71.12% 70.13% 70.08% 81.41% 86.10% 70.08% 
 
The social inclusion index can also be expressed in a linear programming form. To see this, 
note that only relative weights matter; multiplying all weights wi (i ) by a common 
factor will not alter the index value. We can consequently normalize the weights so that 


































≤ ∑    ;  1,..., kn ∀=
0 i w ≥      .  1,..., im ∀=
 
Hence, standard linear programming software packages suffice to compute the aggregated 
social inclusion index, which is evidently an appealing feature for practical applications. We 
note that the outcomes of such exercise for each country j ( ) do not only yield the 
associated relative performance value, but also estimates for the (country-specific, dimension-
specific) implicit policy weights. 
1,..., j =
 
As alluded upon before, the above model is readily complemented with additional weight 
restrictions. For example, in our basic empirical application we will use the following  (and 












 ∑   .     (3)  1,..., i ∀= m
                                                
 
This restriction imposes that any social inclusion dimension that is considered in the model 
should get an (implicit policy) weight of at least 10%. In the same vein, upper bound 
 
7 For each country, we obtain this EW measure by taking the (equally weighted) average of the normalized 
values for the two performance indicators, and consequently dividing this value by the maximal average value in 
the sample (in casu that corresponding to country I).     11 
restrictions can be added.  For example, to impose that any dimension can at most get half of 












 ∑   .     (4)  1,..., i ∀= m
                                                
Observe that these restrictions are linear in the weights, which makes that adding either or 
both to the above programming problem does not change the linear nature of that problem. Of 
course, more specific (even country-specific) weight restrictions that reflect prior information 
(e.g. on expert consensus positions) can further refine the basic evaluation model.
8 In view of 
the above discussion, it is however evident that such refinements will, ceteris paribus, never 
lead to a higher synthetic index value for a country. 
 
We conclude our hypothetical example by calculating such weight-restricted SI values, viz. by 
adding restriction (3) to the basic model. The obtained performance values do not deviate 
much from those associated with the non-restricted measure. The corresponding correlation 
coefficient amounts to almost 99%: the SI values for most countries remain (quasi) the same. 
The only sizeable change is associated with country X, which now achieves an SI value of 
98.09%. We noted earlier that this was a ‘specialized’ country. Although still rather marginal, 
country X’s lower SI value so illustrates that weight restrictions can reduce the ‘adverse’ 
impact of extreme specialization in a particular policy dimension, which apparently comes at 
an excessive cost in terms of the other performance dimensions. Our application to EU 




2.3 The index versus the scoreboard 
 
When constructing a summary indicator for social inclusion per country, the method just 
discussed seems most apt to comply with the demanding issue of legitimate diversity.   
Another advantage of the method is that its basic principles –weights are assigned so as to 
take care of a country’s relative performance in the most generous way– are easily conveyed 
to the general public. They are hard to defy by national decision makers as any other 
weighting scheme would only generate a lower their index value for their country.  Such 
features are desirable for an ‘eye-catching’ and ‘incentive generating’ metric. 
 
It is also crucial to point out that, relative to the case in which the nowadays existing 
(‘disaggregated’) set would in fact be considered by stakeholders as a genuine scoreboard, the 
proposed index does not fundamentally alter the nature of incentive-driven reactions by 
national decision makers. For one thing, if a country realizes a relative performance 
improvement somewhere on the scoreboard, this would directly be reflected in an increased 
index-value (remember that the normalization procedure preserves intensity differences with a 
common reference). Strictly speaking, this observation does not hold for the best overall 
performer(s), since by construction there is a maximum value of 1 for the index.  One should 
however realize that the improvement would then turn up via a widened gap with the second-
best performer. Moreover, the reason for fixing an upper bound echoes our option for 
streamlining relative, i.e. within-sample benchmarking.  Stated differently, the only rationale 
 
8 Compare with Pedraja-Chapparo (1997), who discuss the issue of imposing weight restrictions within the 
context of DEA, and Cherchye and Kuosmanen (2002) who discuss of alternative types of weight restrictions 
that can be used for macro-level performance assessments.     12 
for claiming that “the best in class” has additional room for improvement can be found in 
external benchmarks (i.e. adding other countries to the sample) or exogenously imposed 
targets, which, as we have shown above, can readily be incorporated at the normalization 
stage.  Again, exactly the same remark holds for the scoreboard as such.  With regard to this 
issue, we additionally stress that the method can also be applied to panel data, so that 
intertemporal progress or regress can equally be reported by the summary figure. We return to 
this remark in section 3.2. 
 
Finally, from one point of view, the best (i.e. politically least contestable) summary index 
may seem to be the one which is exactly based on the set of commonly agreed indicators.  
Yet, if we want the rules of the benchmarking exercise to be fully similar for all member 
states, there can only be an exact correspondence between the existing set and the synthetic 
index if sufficient, reliable data are available for each dimension and each country (i.e. if there 
are no missing data entries in the scoreboard).  As we have indicated, today this presents a 
practical difficulty.  At first glance, this may be taken as the Achilles’ heel of the entire 
exercise.  But once more, this observation in itself does not tilt the balance in favour of an 
(incomplete) n x  m-table.  Quite the reverse, there are some good reasons to advocate a 
synthetic index in this case, even if that index only inexactly corresponds to the original, 
incomplete set.  We take up this issue in the following section, where empirical applications 




3. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 
 
3.1 Basic Application 
 
We first present an application of model (2) with only 4 performance dimensions included, 
viz. the low income rate, the income quintile ratio, the long-term unemployment rate and early 
school leavers (the precise definitions –still in use December 1, 2002– can be found in Annex 
I of the ‘Joint Report on Social Inclusion’ (2002))
9. These indicators appear both on the 
current (OMC) scoreboard for social inclusion and on the Commission’s list of ‘structural 
indicators for social cohesion’. The associated data are tabulated in Appendix 1. Effectively, 
this implies that we start by neglecting 6 primary indicators of the current OMC-scoreboard 
(and 3 structural indicators), the reason being that not all 15 EU countries provide data for 
these indicators yet. 
 
Whether this marks today’s (practical) point of breakdown for a synthetic social inclusion 
indicator is, however, arguable.
10  There are certain quality criteria for a synthetic indicator 
which only partially overlap with the quality criteria for a ‘learning’ set of sub-indicators. A 
marked difference between the two is the different stance towards highly intercorrelated sub-
indicators.  When the aim is to provide a better understanding of the causes and processes of 
social exclusion, high correlations may indeed be conducive to grasp what is essentially a 
                                                 
9 Many of the data we use in our empirical application were taken from Eurostat’s website list of structural 
indicators.  If figures were unavailable there, we used data as given in the Joint Inclusion Report.  Additional  
figures were taken from Eurostat’s Yearbook 2002, and the Commission’s publications The social situation in 
the European Union and Social Protection in Europe. 
10 In its ‘Opinion on social indicators’ of May 29, 2002, the Economic and Social Committee has emphasised 
that the indicators must be transparent and accessible to the public.  We may therefore largely be dealing with a 
temporary problem.     13 
multi-faceted phenomenon.  Conversely though, this implies that there is little information 
lost in terms of overall explanatory power when one of two highly correlated indicators is 
neglected (see e.g. JRC (2002)). This observation is relevant to one of our excluded 
indicators, to wit, the rate of persistent low income.  A statistic which measures how many 
people failed to attain the low income rate in at least two of three consecutive years, does tell 
us something about poverty dynamics.  For the available data, it is strongly correlated with the 
low income rate (which is included in our analysis); the correlation coefficient amounts to 
96.12%. This makes that excluding the rate of persistent low income hardly affects an 
analysis aimed at providing a summary picture: results would be roughly similar if the 
indicator were included, provided sufficient data were available.  
 
However, this reasoning does not apply for the remaining two indicators on the list of 
structural indicators, viz. ‘regional cohesion’ and the ‘number of people in jobless 
households’. The highest associated correlation with any of the 4 included indicators is 
40.08% for the former and 43.27% for the latter (in both cases with the long term 
unemployment rate). For the jobless households indicator, the problem of limited data 
availability is probably of a temporary nature as EU members have committed themselves to 
regularly reporting this figure in the future. Still, it is a structural problem for the indicator of 
regional cohesion, which captures regional (coefficients of) variation in employment levels at 
Nuts2 level.  For, given the absence of this particular regional breakdown-level, Denmark, 
Ireland and Luxemburg will never report the currently used regional cohesion figures. In 
section 3.3, we return to the issue when dealing with omitted performance dimensions. 
 
For each indicator, we used the average of available data over the period 1995-2001 in our 
basic performance assessment model. Of course, this implies that our basic application is not  
a dynamic analysis. We take up a discussion of the possible dynamic use of the proposed 
methodology in section 3.2. The use of average data partly deals with the problem that data 
may be characterized by measurement errors; we can expect that these errors average out. 
Still, errors-in-the-data may partly influence our results. Again, we refer to our discussion 
below for other possible ways to deal with measurement errors in the current framework. 
 
Table 3 displays the results of our basic, illustrative exercise. For each country, the SI-value 
and its associated optimal policy weights are displayed for two variants of model (2), viz. one 
in which we appended restriction (3), and another in which both restrictions (3) and (4) were 
included.     14 
 
Table 3: SI results for EU countries; 2 weight configurations 
  (each weight at least 10%)    (each weight at least 10%; at most 50%) 

















B  72.97% 10.00%  10.00%  70.00%  10.00%    68.12% 21.36%  10.00%  50.00%  18.64% 
DK 100.00% 10.00%  43.74%  10.00%  36.26%    100.00% 10.00%  43.74%  10.00%  36.26% 
D  76.52% 10.00%  10.00%  70.00%  10.00%    73.90% 10.00%  10.00%  50.00%  30.00% 
EL  55.17% 10.00%  10.00%  70.00%  10.00%    51.96% 10.00%  10.00%  50.00%  30.00% 
E  29.61% 10.00%  10.00%  70.00%  10.00%    26.60% 30.00%  10.00%  50.00%  10.00% 
F  74.71% 10.00%  10.00%  70.00%  10.00%    72.00% 10.00%  10.00%  50.00%  30.00% 
IRL 61.46% 10.00%  10.00%  51.16%  28.84%    61.33% 10.00%  10.00%  50.00%  30.00% 
I  37.05% 10.00%  10.00%  70.00%  10.00%    35.92% 10.00%  30.00%  50.00%  10.00% 
L  96.58% 10.00%  10.00%  10.00%  70.00%    90.94% 30.00%  10.00%  10.00%  50.00% 
NL  89.62% 10.00%  10.00%  10.00%  70.00%    87.76% 30.00%  10.00%  10.00%  50.00% 
A  98.40% 10.00%  10.00%  10.00%  70.00%    97.15% 10.00%  10.00%  30.00%  50.00% 
P  62.02% 10.00%  10.00%  10.00%  70.00%    44.77% 10.00%  10.00%  30.00%  50.00% 
FIN 100.00% 70.00%  10.00%  10.00%  10.00%    100.00% 50.00%  10.00%  30.00%  10.00% 
S   100.00% 10.00%  10.00%  65.86%  14.14%    100.00% 23.19%  10.00%  50.00%  16.81% 
UK  89.81% 10.00%  10.00%  70.00%  10.00%    88.84%  10.00%  10.00%  50.00%  30.00% 
Notes: (1) B= Belgium; DK= Denmark; D= Germany; EL= Greece; E= Spain; F= France; IRL= Ireland; I= Italy; L= Luxembourg; NL= 
The Netherlands; A= Austria; P= Portugal; FIN= Finland; S= Sweden; UK= United Kingdom. (2) LIR, IQR, ESL and LTUR stand for  
(the weights accorded to) the low income rate, the income quintile ratio, early school leavers and long-term unemployment, 
respectively. 
 
Apart from their strict interpretation as benefit-of-the-doubt weighted summary indices for 
social inclusion, these results suggest that a synthetic performance measure can be helpful in 
identifying patterns in the relative global performance over the EU countries. One notices e.g. 
the apparent difference between the southern and northern countries in our sample, or the 
intermediate position taken by the ‘corporatist-conservative welfare state’ cluster Germany, 
France and Belgium. One also observes that the majority of SI values are hardly affected by 
adding an extra (maximum) weight restriction in the second variant. The correlation between 
the two arrays of SI values amounts to more than 98.5% (as only Portugal’s SI value drops 
considerably). 
 
The tabulated weights are, to recall, endogenously generated by the maximization procedure 
and can thus reveal interesting information about the implicit (i.e. ‘revealed’) policy priorities. 
For countries that achieve a maximal SI value of 100%, the presented weights are not 
necessarily unique: there may exist other weight combinations that also yield a maximal SI 
value. The technical reason is that the underlying maximization procedure stops as soon as it 
reaches the maximum score of 100%. Which particular weight combination is selected then 
depends on the algorithm that is followed. Such multiple optimal solutions do generically not 
occur for countries with an SI value below 100%.  
 
Nevertheless, even if some countries’ tabulated weights characterize only a single optimum of 
the programming problem, the weights do possess useful indicative value. In Table 3, we 
observe that there appear to be important differences in the distribution of the weights over 
countries. For example, Germany, France, Belgium are among the countries which attach a 
high implicit weight to the educational dimension (see the maximal weight of 70% (50%) for 
the indicator ‘early school leavers’ in the left (right) half of Table 3). By contrast, other 
countries such as  the Netherlands and Portugal, by virtue of the fact that their long term 
unemployment performance figures constitute their areas of comparative advantage, are taken 
to prioritize that dimension.      15 
 
To conclude the discussion of our basic application, we point out that while the SI results are 
barely influenced by adding the maximal weight restriction, the revealed policy weights 
themselves seem to be a bit more responsive; weight correlations among the two variants 
range from 0.72 (low income rate) to 0.90 (early school leavers).  Actually, in most cases 
covered by the left part of Table 3, an evaluated country assigns all (free) weight to just one 
dimension.  Such phenomena are quite natural given that one only appends a single minimum 
weight restriction such as (3) to a benefit of the doubt weighting exercise.  It further stands to 
reason that this phenomenon is mitigated as more (external) restrictions are added.  At the 
right half of Table 3, countries have effectively been ‘enforced’ to further specify their 
implicit priorities.  In that sense, the reported weights at the right side reveal more information 
than those with minimal (imposed) structure generated by the first variant.  Again, we stress 
that, globally, only Portugal is really affected by the fact that it can no longer assign all free 
weight to its unemployment figure but must spread its remaining policy ‘mass’ over at least 
one other dimension.   
 
 
3.2 Intertemporal Analysis 
 
The proposed methodology can also be applied for intertemporal analysis. Specifically, it can 
be used to identify whether there is progress or regress in terms of social inclusion. We 
illustrate this for the years 1996 and 1997. The analysis concentrates on 14 EU countries only 
(due to limited data availability, we were not able to compute results for Luxembourg). 
Because of the data problems discussed before, this example again mainly serves illustrative 
purposes, and the results should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the SI results for the years 1996 and 1997. Performance results have been 
computed for the pooled country sample, i.e. including both the 1996 and 1997 
observations.
11 The countries have been ranked according to their relative performance in 
1996. For that year, we roughly get a similar picture as in Table 3 (which was based on 1995-
2000 averages). Spain, Italy and Greece have rather low SI values, while Denmark, Finland 
Austria and Sweden are on top. We further find that most countries achieve a higher SI value 
in 1997 than in 1996; only Greece, Portugal and the UK exhibit a performance deterioration. 
Actually, the 1997 subsample includes the three ‘benchmark’ observations Finland, Denmark 
and Sweden (i.e. the observations associated with a 100% SI value). 
 
These figures suggest a general social inclusion performance improvement within the EU 
between 1996 and 1997. This overall picture is confirmed by Figure 2. The performance 
deterioration of Greece, Portugal and the UK is rather small; it only marginally exceeds the 
2% level. By contrast, the relative performance improvements are sometimes quite 
pronounced. For example, the relative performance of Spain and the Netherlands increased 
with almost 6% and 8%, respectively. 
 
As this example makes clear, the possibilities of the proposed methodology are in principle 
not limited to computing levels of social inclusion performance: the same methodology is 
readily applicable for identifying changes in the relative performance. Evidently, such 
analysis of performance shifts over time can provide a useful input within the context of 
policy evaluations. 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Färe and Grosskopf (1992) and Färe et al. (1994) for alternative procedures.      16 
 
 




























































3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Our previous discussion makes clear that, certainly in the current context, practical 
implementation of the proposed evaluation procedure almost inevitably entails a number of 
implicit, possibly debatable assumptions. In this section, we illustrate how one can check 
sensitivity of the performance results with respect to the weighting scheme and the number of 
original indicators within the proposed framework. Specifically, we examine the robustness of 
our basic analysis presented in section 3.1 (i.e., including 4 basic social  performance 
dimensions, and using only a lower weight bound of 10%). We will refer to the associated 
performance index as the ‘Basic’ index. 
 
 
OTHER WEIGHT ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The endogenous determination of implicit policy weights constitutes the basic feature of the 
adopted methodology. In the construction of our Basic index, we imposed that each 
performance dimension should get a policy weight of at least 10%. The ad hoc nature of that 
assumption calls for investigating the sensitivity of our results. We have already discussed the     17 
impact of adding a maximal weight restriction in section 3.1. The general issue of sensitivity 
of a synthetic indicator to (pre-assigned) weight selection is also taken up in the JRC-report 
(2002), where interesting (resampling) procedures are discussed. Here, we confine ourselves 
to a comparison of our Basic index results with those of two alternative performance indexes: 
the index that imposes equal weights for all social inclusion indicators (EW) and the index 
that imposes no weight restrictions apart from non-negativity (NWR); see section 2.2 for the 
construction of these two alternative indexes. In a certain sense, these two alternatives can be 
considered as limiting cases in terms of the underlying (a priori) assumptions regarding the 
distribution of policy priorities. 
 
A natural and concise way to compare the results associated with different performance 
indexes consists in looking at the associated correlation coefficients as in Table 4. The results 
in this table clearly illustrate the intermediate position of the Basic index; it correlates 
stronger with the EW index than the NWR index and stronger with the NWR index than the 
EW index. Further, we find that the Basic index correlates stronger with the NWR index than 
with the EW index. Overall, however, the relatively high correlation values suggest that 
different a priori assumptions regarding the distribution of policy priorities need not entail 
very divergent results on aggregate social inclusion performance. In other words, in the 
aggregate the specific weight restriction does not appear to have great impact on the 
calculated performance results. Recall, however, that models which endogenously determine 
the policy weights have clear value added in terms of ‘revealing’ implicit policy weights. 
 
Although the aggregate impact of alternative weight restrictions may admittedly be rather 
limited, differences can be quite substantial at the level of individual countries. Indeed, for a 
number of countries we observe considerably different SI results dependent on the model that 
is used for quantifying overall performance (the Basic, the EW or the NWR variant); see 
Appendix 2. Yet in fact, these country-specific performance shifts can reveal interesting 
information. A notable example in this respect concerns the case of the UK. Looking at the 
original indicator values in Appendix 1, we find that this country achieves the lowest ESL 
value in our sample of 15 EU countries.
12 By contrast, the UK exhibits rather poor 
performance in terms of the LIR and IQR. Finally, the country performs moderately well in 
terms of the LTUR. Generally, this pattern suggests that the UK ‘specializes’ mainly in the 
educational dimension of social inclusion, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the employment 
dimension. The UK performance pattern is considerably different from that of, e.g., the 
Nordic countries, which perform relatively well in all 4 SI performance dimensions. 
 
The EW aggregate performance index strongly penalizes this apparent specialization of the 
UK; the associated performance value amounts to only 62.10%. By contrast, the NWR index 
fully rewards such emphasizing of a single SI performance dimension; in this model, the UK 
achieves the maximum performance value of 100%. It could be argued, however, that such an 
index, completely determined by a sole performance dimension, fails in capturing overall 
social inclusion performance. By restricting the policy weights to be at least 10%, the Basic 
index, which equals 89.81% for the UK, corrects for such apparent ‘over’-compensation. In 
fact, the only three countries that achieve the maximum performance value for this index are 
the ‘well-balanced’ Nordic countries. 
 
                                                 
12 We note that this result may at least partly be due to data atypicity: the ESL figures we used for the UK were 
those appearing in the Annex of the Joint Inclusion Report since contrary to other countries, there are currently 
no ESL-figures displayed for the UK in Eurostat’s website list of structural indicators.     18 
This example suggests that the (Basic) weight-restricted SI model conveniently combines the 
attractive features of the ‘extreme’ EW and NWR models: (1) it allows for assigning national 
policy priorities (unlike the EW model); and yet (2) it penalizes over-specialization in a single 





Another aspect of sensitivity analysis pertains to the selection of the performance dimensions. 
As discussed in section 3.1, limited data availability prevented us from including all official 
indicators of social inclusion in the Basic index. This suggests examining the robustness of 
the performance results with respect to the omitted performance dimensions. In particular, we 
consider ‘jobless households’ and ‘regional cohesion’, which do not strongly correlate with 
the 4 indicators that are included in the basic model. In addition, we consider the impact of  
other indicators on the social scoreboard, viz. those pertaining to the health status of a 
population (as reflected by ‘life expectancy at birth’ and the ‘health’ indicator, which captures 
the self-perceived health status by income level).  The original (averaged) data are reported in 
Appendix 1. 
 
As before, the impact of omitting a particular performance dimension can be checked by 
comparing (in terms of correlation coefficients) the results of the Basic index, which does not 
include the corresponding indicator, with those of the (similarly constructed) index that does 
incorporate the indicator. In some cases, this entails comparison of samples of different size. 
For example, regional cohesion and jobless household values are reported for only 12 EU 
countries, and health values are available for only 13 EU countries. Evidently, in those cases 
we compute index values and correlation coefficients for evaluation models that include the 
smaller samples. 
 
For our application, we find that omitting the aforementioned performance dimensions has 
little impact on the performance results (see again Table 4, column 1): the correlation between 
the newly constructed indexes and the Basic index everywhere amounts to more than 90%. 
This suggests that excluding these dimensions from the social inclusion analysis does not 
have strong distortionary effects: good (poor) performers generally remain good (poor) 
performers. 
 
Again, it may be informative to consider performance shifts at the level of individual 
countries; see the results in Appendix 2. In that respect, the substantial increase of the 
Portuguese index value when including jobless households in the analysis is especially 
remarkable. Indeed, this country achieves the best performance in that social inclusion 
dimension, while performance in the dimensions that underlie the Basic index (except from 
the long term unemployment) is generally very poor; see Appendix 1. Hence, including the 
jobless household dimension in the computation of the (unequally weighted) performance 
index naturally increases Portugal’s associated SI value. 
 
 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
As a final validity check, we compare our results with those of alternative measures that have 
been used for cross-country assessments of social policies. In particular, we look at the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI) (UNDP, 2001),     19 
suggested as measures for the economic and social aspects of sustainable development. We 
also consider the PAIN index, which Asher et al. (1993) proposed as a summary measure of 
distributive justice. Our specific construction of the PAIN-index is different from that 
originally proposed (it was originally constructed with fixed pre-assigned weights); we 
aggregate the poverty rate and the Gini coefficient using the SI model presented in section 2.2 
(including a lower weight bound of 10%). 
 
The relevant correlation coefficients are presented in the bottom rows of Table 4. Not very 
surprisingly, we find a positive correlation between the Basic index and each of the 3 
alternative social performance indexes. The strongest correlation is associated with the PAIN 
index; this index indeed being most directly comparable in terms of its specific scope. Next, 
we find that our Basic SI correlates stronger with the HDI than with the HPI. This may appear 
somewhat counter-intuitive, given that the HPI comes closer in spirit to the social inclusion 
concept than the HDI. Still, the differences between the HDI and HPI correlation coefficients 
remain rather small. 
 
The correlation is far from perfect. Of course, this reflects the different construction of the 
alternative indexes, both in terms of the dimensions that are included and (only for the HPI 
and HDI) in terms of the underlying weighting procedure. On the other hand, it also indicates 
that a full assessment of social policy can benefit from comparing the results for differently 
conceptualized performance indexes: dependent on its specific orientation, each index 
contains useful information concerning particular policy aspects. 
 
Table 4: alternative synthetic indicators; correlation matrix  
   Basic  EW  NWR  + Regcoh  + Jl H  + Health  + LE  HDI  HPI  PAIN 
Basic  100.00%             
EW  92.98%  100.00%               
NWR  97.88%  83.81%  100.00%          
+ Regcoh  90.58% 85.92% 87.63% 100.00%             
+ Jl H  90.72% 71.76% 94.70%  82.26% 100.00%           
+ Health  97.36% 88.42% 95.43%  86.85%  82.41%  100.00%         
+ LE  94.96% 96.11% 88.25%  87.25%  80.28% 88.91%  100.00%       
HDI  56.23% 74.25% 43.18%  43.07%  13.92% 51.35% 62.72%  100.00%     
HPI  47.40% 63.30% 38.83%  49.13%  30.27% 12.38% 60.34% 49.52%  100.00%   
PAIN  77.64% 93.27% 64.53%  70.52%  49.67% 64.80% 88.43% 74.44% 82.41%  100.00% 
Note: Basic stands for the basic configuration; EW stands for basic selection of dimensions with equal weights; NWR stands for basic 
selection of dimensions and no weight restrictions;  +Regcoh stands for basic with ‘regional cohesion’ included; + Jl H stands for basic with 
‘jobless households’ included; + Health stands for basic configuration with ‘Health” included; +LE stands for basic configuration with ‘Life 
expectancy’ included; HDI stands for ‘Human Development Index’; HPI stands for ‘Human Poverty Index’; PAIN stands for ‘PAIN index’. 
 
 
3.4 Performance analysis versus efficiency analysis 
 
As both the scoreboard and the index (deliberately) focus solely on policy outcomes, they can 
surely be criticized precisely because they totally abstract from the inputs that nations employ 
for their social inclusion goals.  Yet in all likelihood, advancing social inclusion is not a free 
lunch.  For example, there is quite some statistical evidence that there exists a negative 
relationship between a country’s social spending/GDP ratio and its low income rate (see e.g. 
Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999).  Can a similar relationship be discerned between total financial 
inputs and an index which captures all (policy-weighted) outcomes simultaneously?    
     20 
Figure 3 summarises elementary results from such an exercise. We regressed the Basic index 
values on (gross) social expenditure as a % of GDP.  Although the particular relationship may 
well be positive but nonlinear, we have added a linear regression line together with its 
goodness-of-fit statistic (R²=0.3455).  Interestingly, this implies a moderately better 
goodness-of-fit in comparison with a similar (simple) linear regression which only considers 
the low income rate as dependent variable.
13 
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Of course, once that policy inputs are allowed to enter the picture, it may well be that a 
mediocre outcome is achieved economically, just as it may be that impressive performance is 
accomplished inefficiently (indeed, national politicians do face more trade-offs than those 
related to social inclusion).  We will not develop the issue of efficiency measurement in this 
paper, but confine ourselves to recalling that the method we discuss is in point of fact rooted 
in the theory of productivity measurement.  Hence, the above procedure can be quite naturally 
adapted to take inputs –and other outputs– into account (see Zaim et al. (2001) for such an 
application based on the UNDP-HDI), or even for genuinely assessing the relative productive 
efficiency of social service provision. 
 
                                                 
13 For our data, we have (LIR) = 0.3142 – 0.5915 (SE), and R² = 0.3069.  Actually, the fact that the use of a 
synthetic index as dependent variable may increase the overall fit has also been observed in the context of 
synthetic indices for macroeconomic performance (versus the single dimensional GDP-growth variable), when 
investigating their relationship with social capital.  See Moesen et al. (1998).     21 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we focused on a set of indicators for social inclusion in its capacity as a social 
scoreboard. We presented a methodology for merging the various dimensions into one 
synthetic indicator of social inclusion.  The obtained single-valued index has an intuitive, easy 
to convey interpretation and is receptive to valuing the legitimate diversity of national 
policies. The methodology, grounded in microeconomic theory, is based on the benefit-of-the-
doubt principle, which allows countries to attach higher weights to those social inclusion 
dimensions in which they perform relatively well. The endogenously defined weights can be 
interpreted as implicitly revealed policy priorities. Additionally, the method straightforwardly 
allows for incorporating all kinds of prior assumptions concerning the feasible range of policy 
weights. And, the method can readily include external targets or external comparison partners 
in social inclusion performance assessments. 
 
We have illustrated the methodology by means of a basic application to the 15 EU countries, 
assessing social inclusion performance for the period 1995-2001. Subsequently, we have 
shown how one can use the proposed method for intertemporal performance assessments, and 
have indicated how one can examine the sensitivity of the obtained performance results with 
respect to the policy weighting assumptions that are used and the social inclusion dimensions 
that are included. Finally, we have touched upon the relationship between synthetic social 
inclusion policy performance and social inclusion policy efficiency. 
 
For the sake of transparency, we have mainly limited our discussion to introducing the basic 
methodology, and opted for a very basic application which was principally intended to serve 
illustrative purposes. This makes that we have not fully addressed a number of issues that 
become of  essence in more extensive practical applications: 
 
1.  First, we have largely left open the issue of specifying prior assumptions concerning the 
distribution of policy priorities. In our application, we used minimal assumptions 
concerning generally acceptable lower and upper bounds for the relative weights, and we 
complemented this with a general discussion regarding the possibility of checking 
sensitivity with respect to the employed weighting assumptions. As we have repeatedly 
stressed, however, additional (more stringent) weight bounds can readily be incorporated 
in the evaluation models. Such assumptions can further benefit the analysis. They may, 
e.g., reflect expert consensus positions. Generally, we believe that the conception of such 
additional weight restrictions constitutes a promising avenue for further research. 
 
2.  Next, we have chosen to refrain from an explicit discussion of dealing with low quality 
data. For example, we have not explicitly addressed the issue of measurement errors, 
which is certainly important in today’s practical context of social inclusion assessment in 
the EU. In our application, we simply employed average data (over the period 1995-2001) 
to partly deal with that problem, as it can be expected that errors-in-the-data average out. 
Still, more advanced techniques to deal with practical data problems have been proposed 
in the closely related productivity measurement (or ‘Data Envelopment Analysis’) 
literature; see Cherchye and Post (2001) for an up-to-date discussion. We confine 
ourselves here to stating that these techniques can be readily integrated in the presented 
framework. 
 
3.  More generally, we have limited our empirical analysis to ‘point estimates’ for the SI 
values and policy weights.  Of course, it would be interesting to complement such point     22 
estimates with confidence intervals.  These can be constructed by using resampling 
techniques (see Simar and Wilson, 1998).  Normally, point estimates will be ‘more 
precise’ as data sets get larger. Addition of the acceding countries’ indicators to the OMC, 
but also our earlier suggestion to enlarge the set of possible comparison partners with 
external, i.e. non EU observations, will in that sense provide a clearer big picture.  Within 
this line of reasoning, we point out there is also a trade-off between the number of (single 
indicator) dimensions considered for the construction of a synthetic indicator and the 
asymptotic efficiency of the estimates, a problem that is known as ‘the curse of 
dimensionality’ in nonparametric estimation models; within the nonparametric 
productivity analysis literature, Simar and Wilson (2000) provide a good methodological 
survey of statistical testing possibilities. 
 
4. Finally, we have addressed the issue of variable selection by means of an easily 
implemented, but rather superficial correlation comparison analysis. We again refer to the 
well-established body of literature on linear programming approaches to productivity   
measurement for more refined, statistical-based variables selection techniques; see, e.g., 
Pastor et al. (2002) for a recent proposal. These can equally be employed in the presented 
framework. Another promising avenue consists in reducing the original number of social 
inclusion indicators by means of principal components analysis techniques; see, e.g., 
Adler and Golany (2001) for an application within a Data Envelopment Analysis setting. 
 
While the Commission has recently affirmed its willingness to use synthetic indicators to 
complement existing single-dimensional gauges, it is at this stage really an open question 
whether their application will ever be deemed appropriate (not in the least by national 
decision makers) in the context of the OMC for poverty and social inclusion.  We are, 
however, not alone in believing that there is a case for increasing public awareness about the 
method, and we do think that a well-designed and robust synthetic indicator may for that 
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APPENDIX 1: DATA; AVERAGE VALUES 1995-2001 
 
   LIR  IQR  ESL  LTUR  Regcoh  Jl H  H  LE  G  SE 
B  16.000 5.900 13.786 5.217  45.771  17.871 0.273 74.000 35.000 27.933 
DK  9.750 2.775 11.229 1.529      0.545 73.500 21.667 29.967 
D  15.750 5.025 13.700 4.417  44.643  15.400 0.600 74.020 30.000 29.467 
EL  22.000 6.550 19.171 5.571  21.143  13.057 0.267 75.340 34.667 24.533 
E  19.500 6.675 30.100 8.929  31.271  13.150 0.429 74.800 34.667 21.200 
F  16.750 4.750 14.417 4.583  21.843  15.233 0.364 74.460 29.667 30.533 
IRL  19.000 5.550 19.550 4.343    15.533 0.250 73.360 33.667 16.000 
I  19.500 5.900 28.700 6.929  65.300  15.071 0.438 75.240 32.333 25.400 
L  12.000 4.700 25.567 0.750    10.286 0.133 73.760 28.500 23.600 
NL  11.500 4.550 16.017 1.871  19.200  12.343 0.429 75.060 29.333 28.967 
A  13.250 4.025 11.267 1.086  26.886  10.843 0.308 74.320 26.333 28.600 
P  22.250 7.275 42.650 2.357  29.386  7.333 0.300 71.520 37.667 22.933 
FIN   8.000 2.900 9.367 4.014 22.771      73.300 22.500 27.733 
S   11.000 3.467 7.225  2.429  20.700      76.680 23.000 33.267 
UK  20.250 5.900  6.000  2.271  40.257  16.686 0.167 74.560 34.000 26.900 
Note: LIR stands for ‘low income rate’ (60% level); IGR stands for ‘income quintile ratio’; ESL stands for ‘early 
school leavers’; LTUR stands for ‘long-term unemployment rate’; Regcoh stands for ‘Regional Cohesion’; Jl H 
stands for ‘Jobless Households’; H stands for ‘Health’; LE stands for ‘Life Expectancy’; G stands for ‘Gini 
coefficient’. See footnote 10 for sources. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: PERFORMANCE RESULTS; ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATIONS 
 
   Basic  EW  NWR  + Regcoh  + Jl H  + H  + LE  HDI  HPI  PAIN 
B  72.97% 54.56% 80.43% 69.01% 73.38% 83.41% 69.38%  100.00%  94.00%  41.36% 
DK  100.00% 100.00% 100.00%      100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  98.00%  100.00% 
D  76.52% 63.14% 80.76% 72.80% 79.85% 76.96% 72.93% 98.00% 98.00%  49.02% 
EL  55.17% 33.79% 64.06% 75.82% 60.24% 68.04% 60.35% 94.00%    17.26% 
E  29.61% 18.38% 34.98% 55.40% 46.81% 36.32% 47.70% 97.00% 95.00%  19.63% 
F  74.71% 61.79% 79.01% 85.90% 78.24% 81.49% 72.27% 98.00% 95.00%  49.47% 
IRL  61.46% 49.53% 66.22%    63.76% 77.72% 58.98% 98.00% 91.00%  25.27% 
I  37.05% 30.88% 39.21% 32.91% 40.56% 43.57% 57.99% 97.00% 94.00%  32.33% 
L  96.58% 75.77% 100.00%    100.00%  100.00%  95.84% 98.00% 96.00%  70.83% 
NL  89.62% 81.05% 92.76% 98.50% 100.00%  90.97% 93.90% 99.00% 98.00%  73.49% 
A  98.40% 87.08%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  99.82% 98.00%    71.15% 
P  62.02% 22.08% 80.35% 64.65% 94.88% 62.39% 56.40% 93.00%    0.00% 
FIN  100.00% 95.66% 100.00% 100.00%      100.00% 99.00% 98.00%  100.00% 
S   100.00% 93.34% 100.00% 100.00%      100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  91.52% 
UK  89.81% 62.10%  100.00% 84.84% 90.82%  100.00%  85.04% 98.00% 91.00%  22.30% 
Note: Basic stands for  the basic configuration; EW stands for basic selection of dimensions with equal weights; NWR stands for basic 
selection of dimensions and no weight restrictions;  +Regcoh stands for basic with ‘regional cohesion’ included; + Jl H stands for basic with 
‘jobless households’ included; + H stands for basic configuration with ‘Health’ included; +LE stands for basic configuration with ‘Life 
expectancy’ included; HDI stands for ‘Human Development Index’; HPI stands for ‘Human Poverty Index’; PAIN stands for ‘PAIN index’. 
 
 